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Review	of	The	Value	of	Rationality	by	Ralph	Wedgwood	Benjamin	Kiesewetter		Forthcoming	in:	Ethics	(April	2019)		Sometimes,	our	attitudes,	such	as	our	beliefs	and	intentions,	are	incoherent	in	a	way	that	 seems	 to	make	 it	 appropriate	 to	 call	us	 irrational,	which	 in	 turn	 suggests	 that	having	 such	 attitudes	 violates	 certain	 norms	 of	 rationality.	 An	 intensely	 debated	question	in	contemporary	analytic	philosophy	–	often	discussed	under	the	heading	of	the	 normativity	 of	 rationality	 –	 concerns	 the	 relevance	 of	 such	 norms	 and	 their	violation.	In	his	seminal	article	“Why	be	rational?”	(Mind	114	[2005]:	509–563),	Niko	Kolodny	raised	the	challenge	to	put	forward	a	positive	reason	for	complying	with	the	norms	of	rationality.	Famously,	he	argues	that	no	plausible	reason	can	be	given,	and	that	the	assumption	that	rationality	has	normative	significance	is	a	myth.	Not	everyone	has	been	convinced	by	his	arguments,	but	many	(including,	most	notably	perhaps,	John	Broome,	Rationality	Through	Reasoning	[Chichester:	Wiley	Blackwell,	2013])	remain	doubtful	about	whether	the	normativity	of	rationality	can	be	vindicated.	It	 is	 very	 natural	 to	 read	Ralph	Wedgwood’s	 rich	 and	 sophisticated	 book	The	
Value	 of	 Rationality	 as	 a	 contribution	 to	 the	 debate	 between	Kolodny,	 Broome,	 and	others,	 which	 aims	 to	 answer	 Kolodny’s	 challenge	 and	 to	 reject	 his	 skeptical	conclusion.	After	all,	according	to	what	Wedgwood	calls	the	“central	claim”	of	his	book,	“the	term	‘rational’	…	expresses	a	normative	concept”	(196).	The	first	chapter	presents	four	objections	to	this	thesis.	Three	of	these	objections	are	dealt	with	in	chapters	2	and	3,	while	answering	the	fourth	–	which	is	explicitly	concerned	with	Kolodny’s	challenge	(38–39)	–		is	the	task	Wedgwood	takes	up	in	“the	whole	rest	of	this	book”	(86).	Caution	should	 be	 exercised,	 however,	 since	Wedgwood’s	 understanding	 of	 both	 rationality	and	normativity	differs	 in	 important	 respects	 from	 that	of	other	participants	 in	 the	debate.		Firstly,	 Kolodny	 and	 Broome	 are	 concerned	 with	 a	 pretheoretical	 notion	 of	rationality,	 which	 is	 anchored	 in	 ordinary	 judgments	 about	 what	 is	 rational	 or	irrational	(cf.	Kolodny	2005,	515).	In	contrast,	Wedgwood	is	mainly	concerned	with	a	theoretical	notion:	he	qualifies	his	central	thesis	by	saying	that	“when	the	term	‘rational’	
	 2	
is	used	in	such	branches	of	intellectual	inquiry	as	formal	epistemology	and	the	theory	of	
rational	 choice,	 it	 expresses	 a	 normative	 concept”	 (196).	 As	 is	well-known,	 in	 such	theories	the	term	‘rational’	is	often	used	in	highly	idealized	ways	that	do	not	necessarily	reflect	ordinary	judgments	of	rationality	(for	example	when	the	theories	assume	that	rational	 agents	 must	 be	 logically	 omniscient),	 and	 hence	 Wedgwood’s	 notion	 of	rationality	differs	from	Kolodny’s	and	Broome’s.	This	is	why	Wedgwood	spends	part	of	his	 book	 discussing	 objections	 to	 the	 normativity	 of	 rationality	 that	 did	 not	worry	Kolodny	and	Broome,	such	as	that	rational	requirements	based	on	an	idealized	notion	of	rationality	cannot	be	normative	because	they	do	not	seem	to	entail	the	agent’s	ability	to	comply	(see	chapter	3).	Wedgwood	appears	to	assume,	however,	that	his	notion	of	‘rationality’	is	broader	than	the	ordinary	one	that	Kolodny	and	Broome	focus	on	and	thus	incorporates	the	rational	requirements	they	are	concerned	with.	In	this	way,	his	project	is	of	more	general	interest	(in	particular	to	formal	epistemologists	and	decision	theorists),	and	his	thesis	that	rationality	is	normative	is	even	more	ambitious	than	the	one	that	Kolodny	rejected.	Moreover,	while	Broome	and	Kolodny	aim	at	 capturing	ordinary	 judgments	of	rationality	and	irrationality	in	terms	of	purely	structural	norms	of	rationality,	which	govern	the	relations	between	what	Scanlon	has	dubbed	“judgment-sensitive	attitudes”	(attitudes	such	as	beliefs	and	intentions),	Wedgwood’s	conception	of	rationality	seems	to	 include,	 in	 addition,	 all	 substantive	 internal	 norms	 of	 justification.	 For	 example,	Wedgwood’s	 notion	 of	 rationality	 includes	 doxastic	 norms	 that	 are	 conditional	 on	sensory	experiences	(cf.	12),	such	as	 those	embraced	by	 internalist	 foundationalists	about	 justification	 –	 norms	 that	 others	 would	 consider	 to	 be	 requirements	 of	substantive	 rationality	 (which	 may	 be	 understood	 in	 terms	 of	 responsiveness	 to	available	 reasons)	 that	 need	 to	 be	 distinguished	 from	 requirements	 of	 structural	rationality	(or	rationality	as	coherence).		Secondly,	Broome,	Kolodny	and	others	(including,	to	put	my	cards	on	the	table,	myself	in	The	Normativity	of	Rationality	[Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2017])	adopt	a	reason-oriented	picture	of	normative	significance,	according	to	which	the	view	that	rationality	is	normative	can	–	and,	indeed,	should	–	be	spelled	out	as	the	thesis	that	a	rational	 requirement	 to	f	 implies	 a	 (pro	 tanto	or	 decisive)	 reason	 to	f.	Wedgwood	dismisses	 this	 approach.	 He	 even	 claims	 that	 “to	 achieve	 reliable	 insights	 into	 the	
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normativity	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 rationality,	 …	 talk	 of	 ‘reasons’	 is	 best	 avoided”	 (87).	Wedgwood	presents	his	opposition	to	reasons	as	an	objection	to	the	so-called	‘Reasons	First’	 approach,	 according	 to	which	 the	notion	of	 a	 reason	 is	 the	most	 fundamental	normative	notion	that	can	be	used	to	explain	other	significant	normative	notions	(see	chapter	4).	However,	since	understanding	the	normative	significance	of	rationality	in	terms	of	reasons	does	not	commit	one	to	the	‘Reasons	First’	approach,	the	rejection	of	this	approach	itself	does	not	put	such	an	understanding	into	question.	As	it	turns	out	in	the	course	of	the	relevant	chapter,	Wedgwood	goes	much	further	than	denying	that	reasons	come	first	–	he	denies	that	there	is	any	important	unified	notion	of	a	normative	reason	at	all:	“there	are	innumerable	different	concepts	of	‘normative	reasons’,	none	of	them	any	more	central	than	any	other”	(94).	What	 is	 the	 alternative	 picture	 of	 normativity	 that	 Wedgwood	 proposes?	Generally	speaking,	Wedgwood’s	approach	might	be	described	as	putting	values	first:	the	“most	fundamental”	normative	concepts	are	“the	concepts	of	all	the	various	kinds	of	values”	(18).	Wedgwood	then	characterizes	the	deontic	in	terms	of	the	evaluative.	A	somewhat	rough	characterization	of	his	contextualist	account	of	‘ought’	is	that	‘It	ought	to	be	the	case	that	A	f-s’	is	true	just	in	case	A’s	f-ing	maximizes	expected	value,	relative	to	some	kind	of	value	and	relative	to	some	distribution	of	probabilities	over	possible	worlds	(chapter	5).	Normative	reasons,	in	turn,	are	understood	in	deontic	terms	(as	explanations	of	 ‘ought’	 facts)	as	well	as	 in	evaluative	terms	(as	 ideal	motivations	or	premises	 of	 good	 reasoning),	 with	 “normative-explanation	 reasons”	 and	 “ideal-motivation	reasons”	constituting	different	notions	of	normative	reasons	that	are	not	coextensional	 (chapter	 4).	 Hence,	 on	 Wedgwood’s	 picture,	 there	 is	 an	 “enormous	variety	of	kinds	of	value”	(15);	each	of	 these	values	generates,	 together	with	all	 the	many	possible	probability	distributions,	 a	 “great	proliferation	of	 ‘oughts’”	 (14);	 and	this	in	turn	gives	rise	(or	is	part	of	what	gives	rise)	to	an	even	greater	proliferation	of	kinds	of	normative	reasons.	As	far	as	the	normativity	of	rationality	is	concerned,	instead	of	understanding	it	as	 the	 claim	 that	 rational	 requirements	 entail	 reasons,	 Wedgwood	 proposes	 to	understand	it	as	involving	the	following	two	principles:	“(a)	rational	mental	states	…	and	rational	mental	events	…	are	in	a	way	good	…;	(b)	if	a	thinker	is	rationally	required	to	f,	 then	 there	 is	 a	 sense	 in	which	 the	 thinker	 ought	 to	f”	 (40).	 Since	Wedgwood	
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assumes	 in	 chapter	 4	 that	 a	 normative	 reason,	 in	 one	 sense,	 just	 is	 “a	 fact	 that	contributes	 towards	 explaining	 a	 normative	 fact”	 (106),	 it	 follows	 –	 at	 least	on	 the	assumption	that	the	‘ought’	in	principle	(b)	isn’t	entirely	unexplained	–	that	rational	requirements	entail	normative	reasons:		 1. If	you’re	rationally	required	to	f,	then	you	ought	to	f.	2. If	 you	 ought	 to	 f,	 then	 there	 is	 some	 fact	 that	 contributes	 towards	explaining	that	you	ought	to	f	(assumption).		3. A	fact	that	contributes	towards	explaining	that	you	ought	to	f	is	a	reason	for	you	to	f.	4. Therefore,	if	you’re	rationally	required	to	f,	then	there	is	a	reason	for	you	to	f.		Wedgwood	does	not	mention	that	his	view	has	this	implication,	presumably	because	he	takes	it	to	be	a	relatively	uninteresting	consequence	of	the	more	fundamental	claims	he	makes	about	the	value	of	rationality	and	the	sense	in	which	we	ought	to	be	rational.	Nevertheless,	 given	 the	well-known	objections	 that	Kolodny	and	others	have	 raised	against	the	particular	thesis	that	rational	requirements	entail	reasons,	it	is	surprising	that	this	implication	is	not	defended	or	even	discussed	in	this	book.	For	example,	the	book	contains	no	discussion	of	the	worry	that	reason-entailing	rational	requirements	would	license	unacceptable	bootstrapping,	nor	of	the	difficulty	of	identifying	a	reason-giving	fact	that	would	count	in	favor	of	satisfying	rational	requirements.	Wedgwood	appears	to	think	that	he	does	not	need	to	worry	about	these	problems	because	he	does	not	understand	the	normativity	of	rationality	in	terms	of	reasons.	But	since	his	view	implies	that	rational	requirements	entail	reasons,	the	problems	seem	to	apply	to	it.	Let’s	have	a	closer	look	at	how	Wedgwood	understands	his	two	principles.	Given	the	innumerable	senses	of	‘ought’	that	his	account	generates,	which	one	is	the	sense	in	which	we	ought	to	do	what’s	rationally	required?	Wedgwood	tells	us	that	“the	kind	of	‘ought’	implied	by	rational	requirements	is	a	subjective	or	information-relative	‘ought’”	(61).	 This	 means	 that	 the	 relevant	 probability	 distribution,	 which	 is	 an	 essential	ingredient	of	every	‘ought’-proposition	according	to	Wedgwood’s	theory,	is	“in	some	way	determined	by	the	totality	of	the	agent’s	mental	states”	(59).		
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But	what	is	the	value	that	determines	the	‘ought’	of	rationality?	Prima	facie,	one	might	 think	 that	 it	 should	 be	 overall	 value.	 However,	 this	 view	 runs	 into	 trouble	because	 it	 generates	 what	 are	 sometimes	 called	 “reasons	 of	 the	 wrong	 kind”	 for	attitudes,	 while	 Wedgwood	 accepts	 (along	 with	 many	 others)	 that	 rationality	 is	insensitive	 to	 such	reasons	 (52).	For	example,	 if	having	an	epistemically	unjustified	belief	promises	certain	benefits,	this	belief	might	be	required	by	a	subjective	‘ought’	that	is	relativized	to	overall	value,	but	this	does	not	seem	to	show	that	such	a	belief	would	be	rational.	Therefore,	the	‘ought’	entailed	by	rational	requirements	cannot	be	the	‘ought’	that	tells	us	to	maximize	expected	overall	value.		So	what	is	the	relevant	value	that	determines	the	sense	in	which	we	ought	to	be	rational	instead?	Wedgwood	promises	to	answer	this	question	in	chapter	6,	in	which	he	puts	forward	the	eponymous	claim	of	his	book,	namely	that	“rationality	is	itself	a	kind	of	value,	a	way	in	which	mental	events	or	collections	of	mental	states	can	be	good”	(136).	According	to	Wedgwood,	rationality	is	a	value	because	rationality	is	a	virtue	–	“broadly	 akin	 to	 the	 cardinal	 virtues	 of	 justice,	 wisdom,	 courage,	 and	 temperance”	(200).	Like	these	other	virtues,	rationality	“involves	three	related	kinds	of	goodness:	i.)	the	goodness	of	a	disposition;	ii.)	the	goodness	of	the	performances	that	manifest	this	disposition;	 iii.)	 the	 ‘abstract’	 goodness	 of	 the	 performances	 that	 this	 disposition	normally	produces”	 (141).	These	kinds	of	 goodness	are	not	 relative	 to	purposes	or	standards,	 but	 “non-relative	 or	 absolute”	 values	 (201).	 	 Against	 this	 backdrop,	Wedgwood	 proposes	 to	 understand	 rational	 requirements,	 in	 analogy	 to	 other	requirements	of	virtue,	as	claims	about	what	is	necessary	to	be	as	rational	as	possible	(149-151).	On	this	approach,	a	rational	requirement	is	“a	kind	of	‘must’,	not	a	kind	of	‘ought’”	(150).		However,	given	the	axiological	assumption	that	rationality	is	a	value,	it	follows	 from	 Wedgwood’s	 account	 of	 ‘ought’	 that	 rational	 requirements	 are	“necessarily	coextensive	with	a	kind	of	‘ought’”	(151).	As	 far	 as	 I	 can	 see,	 however,	 this	 ‘ought’	 is	 not	 the	 subjective	 or	 information-relative	 ‘ought’	 that	 Wedgwood	 announced	 earlier	 in	 his	 book	 as	 constituting	 the	‘ought’	 of	 rationality	 (see,	 e.g.,	 18	 and	 61).	 For	 an	 ‘ought’	 that	 is	 implied	 by	 a	requirement	of	virtue	is	one	that	tells	us	to	maximize	an	actual	value	relative	to	the	omniscient	 probability	 function	 (cf.	 150),	 not	 one	 that	 tells	 us	 to	 maximize	 some	expected	 value	 relative	 to	 a	 limited	 epistemic	 standpoint.	 It	 thus	 turns	 out	 that	
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Wedgwood’s	‘ought’	of	rationality	is,	according	to	his	own	account,	a	fully	objective	one.	This	is	not	by	itself	an	objection	to	his	view,	but	it	is	a	point	where	the	reader	might	find	 it	 difficult	 to	 grasp	 how	Wedgwood’s	 ideas	 about	 the	 ‘ought’	 of	 rationality	 fit	together	and	more	guidance	would	have	been	helpful.	 Indeed,	 the	subjective	 ‘ought’	that	we	 have	 been	 promised	 in	 the	 beginning	 as	 the	 ‘ought’	 of	 rationality	 is	 never	elucidated	 in	 the	 book	 and	 never	mentioned	 again	 after	 chapter	 5	 –	 a	 chapter	 that	provides	a	detailed	 formal	apparatus	 for	understanding	more	or	less	subjective	and	objective	‘oughts’	in	general,	but	no	conception	of	the	‘ought’	of	rationality	in	particular.	This	 is	 particularly	 surprising	 because	 later	 chapters	 do	 in	 fact	 contain	 the	material	 to	 identify	a	subjective	 ‘ought’	 that	 is	entailed	by	rational	requirements.	 In	chapters	8	and	9,	Wedgwood	develops	the	 idea	that	“rationality	 is	not	a	completely	
free-standing	value”,	but	depends	on	its	connection	to	“the	value	of	correctness”	(230).	Correctness	 is	 the	 property	 that	 an	 attitude	 has	when	 it	 satisfies	 a	 certain	 kind	 of	external	 norm	 that	 applies	 constitutively	 to	 all	 attitudes	 of	 that	 type	 (or	 when	 it	achieves	 its	 “external	 aim”	 as	 it	 is	 sometimes	 metaphorically	 described)	 (5).	 For	example,	 “correctness	 for	 beliefs	 is	 a	matter	 of	 the	 truth	 of	 the	 proposition	 that	 is	believed;	 and	 correctness	 for	 choices	 is	 a	matter	 of	 the	 feasibility	 and	 value	 of	 the	course	of	action	that	is	chosen”	(242).	The	relation	between	rationality	and	correctness	is	supposed	to	answer	what	Wedgwood	takes	to	be	the	most	significant	challenge	for	the	view	that	rationality	is	normative,	namely	to	explain	what	is	good	about	the	kind	of	merely	internal	coherence	that	rationality,	according	to	him	and	many	others,	amounts	to.	In	a	nutshell,	his	answer	is	that	achieving	this	coherence	is	the	best	way	to	pursue	the	external	value	of	 correctness,	 and	 in	 fact	 the	only	way	 to	pursue	 this	value	 in	a	guided	way	(235).			Now,	 in	 the	 course	 of	 chapter	 9,	 Wedgwood	 maintains	 that	 “having	 correct	attitudes	…	is	a	genuine	value”	(231),	and	that	“to	be	rational	is	to	do	as	well	as	possible	at	minimizing	expected	 incorrectness”	 (217).	These	 claims	 seem	 to	entail	 (together	with	Wedgwood’s	semantics	for	‘ought’)	that	there	is,	after	all,	a	subjective	‘ought’	that	coincides	 with	 rational	 requirements	 –	 namely	 one	 that	 relates	 to	 the	 value	 of	correctness	(rather	than	the	value	of	rationality)	and	a	probability	distribution	that	represents	the	agent’s	epistemic	perspective	(rather	than	the	omniscient	perspective).	It	is	puzzling	that	Wedgwood	does	not	mention	this	himself.	Throughout,	he	speaks	of	
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the	 ‘ought’	 entailed	 by	 rational	 requirements	 in	 the	 singular,	 and	 in	 chapter	 6	 he	identifies	 this	 ‘ought’	with	 an	 ‘ought’	 that	 is	 related	 to	 the	 value	 of	 rationality	 –	 an	‘ought’	which	his	own	account	classifies	as	an	objective	one.	He	never	states	the	fact	that	 his	 theory	 actually	 delivers	 two	 kinds	 of	 ‘ought’	 that	 are	 entailed	 by	 rational	requirements:	an	objective	one	that	is	related	to	the	actual	value	of	rationality,	and	a	subjective	one	that	is	related	to	the	expected	value	of	correctness.		
The	Value	of	Rationality	is	an	ambitious	and	thought-provoking	book,	which	will	be	 read	 with	 great	 benefit	 by	 anyone	 interested	 in	 the	 theory	 of	 rationality.	Wedgwood’s	conception	of	rationality	as	an	internal	virtue	that	pursues	the	external	aim	 of	 correctness	 is	 original	 and	 highly	 instructive.	 It	 promises	 to	 meet	 several	desiderata	 of	 the	 current	 debate	 on	 rationality,	 by	 (i)	 giving	 a	 unified	 account	 of	epistemic	and	practical	rationality,	(ii)	telling	us	something	informative	about	the	point	of	 rationality	 rather	 than	 listing	 a	 number	 of	 intuitive	 requirements,	 and	 (iii)	elucidating	the	sense	in	which	we	ought	to	be	rational	and	are	criticizable	if	we	aren’t.	But	Wedgwood’s	book	will	not	only	arouse	the	interest	of	those	who	care	about	the	normative	status	of	rationality.	In	fact,	The	Value	of	Rationality	covers	an	impressive	range	 of	 topics	 and	 makes	 novel	 and	 systematically	 interesting	 contributions	 to	 a	number	 of	other	 relevant	 philosophical	 topics,	 such	 as,	 for	 example,	 the	 distinction	between	reasons	of	the	right	and	reasons	of	the	wrong	kind	(chapter	2),	the	principle	that	‘ought’	implies	‘can’	(chapter	3),	and	the	general	structure	of	virtues	(chapter	6).	No	doubt	this	book	will	have	a	lasting	impact	on	the	philosophical	debate,	and	quite	rightly	so.		As	I	already	indicated,	in	my	opinion	the	book	also	has	some	shortcomings.	One	of	them	is	that	many	of	the	crucial	questions	that	Wedgwood’s	theory	poses	and	many	of	the	challenges	that	it	faces	are	only	briefly	discussed	(if	at	all),	while	at	the	same	time	some	of	 the	chapters	of	 the	book	(particularly	chapters	3–5,	all	of	which	have	been	published	as	self-standing	papers	before)	contain	detailed	elaborations	of	points	that	seem	 to	be	only	of	secondary	 importance	 to	 the	book’s	 central	question.	To	be	 fair,	Wedgwood	 emphasizes	 several	 times	 that	 his	 book	 “is	 designed	 to	 be	 the	 first	instalment	of	a	trilogy”	(1),	and	that	his	theory	“will	not	be	presented	in	full	until	the	whole	trilogy	is	complete”	(5).	However,	given	the	passion	for	detail	that	Wedgwood	
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exhibits	with	respect	to	some	other,	less	central	issues,	it	can	at	times	be	frustrating	to	be	put	off	with	respect	to	some	of	the	most	burning	questions	that	his	book	raises.	For	 example,	Wedgwood’s	 interesting	 proposal	 that	 rationality	 is	 a	matter	 of	minimizing	expected	 incorrectness	 faces	 the	 challenge	 to	explain	how	paradigmatic	instances	 of	 structural	 irrationality,	 such	 as	 means/end-incoherence	 or	 akrasia,	constitute	a	violation	of	the	requirement	to	minimize	expected	incorrectness.	This	is	an	 important	 challenge,	not	only	because	accounting	 for	 such	cases	 seems	 to	be	an	independently	plausible	 test	case	 for	any	conception	of	rationality,	but	also	because	Wedgwood	would	 be	 talking	 past	 Broome,	Kolodny	 and	 others	 if	 his	 conception	 of	rationality	did	not	apply	to	 the	paradigmatic	cases	of	 irrationality	with	which	these	authors	are	concerned.	Wedgwood	spends	less	than	three	pages	on	this	issue	(232–4),	which	do	not	mention	the	(arguably	most	difficult)	case	of	means/end-incoherence.	The	 explanation	 of	 akrasia	 essentially	 relies	on	 the	 assumption	 that	 akratic	 agents,	while	intending	some	action	A,	“rationally	have	the	maximum	degree	of	confidence”	in	the	proposition	that	“it	is	better,	all	things	considered,	to	choose	an	alternative	B	rather	than	to	choose	A”	(234).	However,	it	also	seems	akratic	to	intend	A	while	having	a	less	than	 fully	 confident	belief	 in	 that	proposition,	or	a	 less	 than	 fully	 rational	belief	 (or	both).	 Indeed,	 only	 very	 exceptional	 cases	 of	 akrasia	 will	 satisfy	 Wedgwood’s	restrictions,	and	it	is	for	good	reasons	that	the	philosophical	literature	has	focused	on	a	much	more	general	phenomenon.	 It	 is	 thus	very	natural	 to	ask	how	Wedgwood’s	conception	of	rationality	treats	the	vast	majority	of	cases	of	akrasia	in	which	the	belief	is	 not	 rationally	 held	 with	 maximum	 confidence.	 But	 Wedgwood	 skims	 over	 this	question;	he	 jumps	to	the	conclusion	that	his	characterization	of	rationality	“has	no	difficulty	explaining”	the	rational	requirement	that	bans	akrasia	(234).	Another	 set	 of	 questions	 that	 the	 book	 raises	 but	 does	 not	 address	 concerns	normative	 conflicts.	According	 to	Wedgwood’s	 conception	of	normativity,	 there	 is	 a	variety	of	values	and	an	infinite	number	of	senses	of	‘ought’	and	‘reason’,	all	of	which	can	issue	conflicting	directives.	For	example,	the	value	of	rationality	can	conflict	with	the	value	of	correctness,	or	with	the	value	of	pleasure,	or	with	other	values.	Relative	to	each	of	 these	values,	 there	will	be	objective	senses	of	 ‘ought’	 that	give	 incompatible	prescriptions,	not	to	mention	the	innumerable	less	objective	senses	of	‘ought’.	It	looks	like	this	will	have	devastating	effects	on	practical	reasoning,	unless	there	is	a	privileged	
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notion	 of	 ‘ought’	 and	 ‘reason’	 that	 determines	 the	 correctness	 conditions	 for	deliberative	conclusions.	Are	there	such	privileged	notions	–	and	how	are	they	related	to	the	rational	‘ought’?		Wedgwood	 is	 almost	 completely	 silent	 on	 such	 questions.	 There	 is	 one	 brief	passage	 in	which	he	mentions	the	view	that	“when	virtues	[like	 justice	and	charity]	conflict,	they	can	be	weighed	against	each	other,	to	determine	what	is	the	right	thing	for	the	agent	to	do	all	things	considered”,	and	he	maintains	that	“rationality	does	not	just	count	as	one	virtue	among	many	in	this	way”	(201).	This	strikes	me	as	exactly	right,	which	is	one	of	the	reasons	why	I	favor	a	conception	of	rationality	as	the	capacity	to	respond	 to	 reasons	 –	 the	 reasons,	 if	 you	 see	 the	 need	 for	 this	 qualification,	 that	correspond	 to	 the	 notion	 of	 ‘ought’	 pertinent	 in	 conclusions	 of	 deliberation.	 It	 is	difficult	to	see,	however,	how	Wedgwood’s	account,	according	to	which	rationality	is	a	matter	of	pursuing	one	particular	kind	of	value	among	many	others,	can	account	for	this	special,	non-conflicting	status	of	rationality.	What	he	says	is	that	“the	requirements	of	rationality	are	decisive”	(202)	with	respect	to	every	‘ought’	that	is	“(a)	internalist	…,	and	(b)	determined	purely	by	‘reasons	of	the	right	kind’	for	the	attitude	in	question”	(201–2).	 But	 Wedgwood	 told	 us	 before	 that	 ‘oughts’	 aren’t	 really	 determined	 by	reasons	 at	 all,	 but	 by	 values	 and	 probabilities	 (in	 fact,	 he	 even	 told	 us	 that	 talk	 of	reasons	 is	 best	 avoided).	 As	 far	 as	 I	 can	 see,	 the	 values	 relevant	 for	 ‘oughts’	 that	correspond	 to	 ‘reasons	 of	 the	 right	 kind’	 seem	 to	 be	 the	 values	 of	 rationality	 or	correctness.	So,	what	Wedgwood	tells	us	is	that	rational	requirements	do	not	conflict	with	(certain	kinds	of)	‘oughts’	that	are	determined	by	the	value	of	rationality	or	the	value	 of	 correctness.	 But	 surely,	 the	 requirements	 of	 justice	 or	 charity	 also	 do	 not	conflict	with	certain	kinds	of	 ‘oughts’	that	are	determined	by	the	values	of	justice	or	charity.	 It's	 thus	 not	 clear	 how	 we	made	 any	 progress	 towards	 understanding	 the	special	 status	 of	 rationality	 that	 would	 explain	 why	 rationality	 isn’t	 simply	 to	 be	weighed	against	other	values.		In	 the	 immediately	 following	 passage,	 Wedgwood	 seems	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	special	 normative	 status	of	 rationality	 is	 due	 to	 its	 inescapability	 as	 a	 “constitutive	virtue	of	thought”	(202).	But	it	is	difficult	to	see	why	the	descriptive	or	conceptual	fact	(if	it	is	a	fact)	that	“all	thinkers	have	at	least	some	disposition	to	conform	to	the	most	
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basic	requirements	of	rationality”	(202)	should	be	taken	to	support	 the	assumption	that	rationality	is	(in	some	sense)	normatively	decisive.		A	 further	general	worry	that	one	might	have	with	this	book	 is	 that,	at	bottom,	Wedgwood	seems	to	take	for	granted	his	most	important	claims	rather	than	arguing	for	them.	The	central	claim	that	rationality	is	a	value,	despite	being	summarized	as	a	thesis	that	was	“argued”	(196)	and	“defended”	(200)	in	chapter	6,	is,	as	far	as	I	can	see,	neither	argued	nor	defended	in	that	chapter,	but	simply	postulated.	In	later	chapters,	Wedgwood	aims	to	explain	the	value	of	rationality	by	showing	how	it	is	related	to	the	value	 of	 correctness.	 But	 again,	 the	 thesis	 that	 correctness	 is	 a	 value	 is	 simply	presupposed	as	“intuitively	clear”	(231).	Now,	there	is	nothing	wrong	in	principle	with	starting	 a	 philosophical	 inquiry	 from	 assumptions	 that	 one	 takes	 to	 be	 intuitively	plausible,	 but	 it	 seems	 that	 the	 claims	 that	 rationality	 and	 correctness	 are	 non-instrumentally	 valuable	 are	 in	 fact	 very	 controversial,	 especially	 in	 the	 dialectical	context	at	issue.	For	example,	it	seems	to	me	far	from	obvious	that	the	mere	correctness	of	 a	 belief	 in	 an	 utterly	 trivial	 truth	 makes	 belief	 in	 that	 proposition	 “genuinely	valuable”	in	a	“non-relative	or	absolute	sense”.	Moreover,	if	correctness	were	a	genuine	absolute	value	of	this	sort,	this	would	seem	to	provide	practical	reasons	to	change	the	facts	in	such	ways	that	they	make	our	beliefs	true,	no	less	than	reasons	to	adjust	our	beliefs	to	the	facts.	Intuitively,	however,	there	are	no	such	practical	reasons	to	change	the	 facts	 in	 order	 to	 make	 our	 beliefs	 correct.	 Perhaps	 worries	 like	 these	 can	 be	resolved.	But	in	order	to	be	resolved,	they	need	to	be	addressed.	I	would	have	liked	to	seen	Wedgwood	do	more	to	substantiate	his	controversial	axiological	assumptions	and	defend	them	in	light	of	such	potential	problems.*		 BENJAMIN	KIESEWETTER	
Humboldt	University	of	Berlin	
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